Research

Working Papers

Learning to Charge More: A Theoretical Study of Collusion by Q-Learning Agents

Submited.

PDF (2025)

In the setting of infinite repeated games, when the game admits both a one stage Nash equilibrium price and a collusive-enabling price, and when the Q-function satisfies certain inequalities at the end of experimentation, firms learn to consistently charge supracompetitive prices.
We introduce a new class of one-memory subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) and provide conditions under which learned behavior is supported by naive collusion, grim trigger policies, or increasing strategies.
Naive collusion does not constitute an SPE unless the collusive-enabling price is a one-stage Nash equilibrium, whereas grim trigger policies can.

Competition and Collusion in Two-Sided Markets with an Outside Option

R&R International Journal of Industrial Organization

PDF (2025)

Population heterogeneity matters for policy, as prices and consumer surplus may both increase or decrease with respect to an outside option or increased competition, depending on the relative size of user heterogeneity.
Platform collusion under small cross-side externalities resembles classic monopoly pricing: platforms extract more surplus at the expense of user welfare, resulting in higher prices and lower market participation compared to the competitive case.

Dynamic Competition for Customer Memberships

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 34, 525-556 (2025).

If firms can choose between long- and short-term memberships, the latter are offered in equilibrium. This result is robust to various extensions, including switching coupons or discounts, naive consumers, sunk costs, and asymmetric differentiation parameters.
Firms are indifferent between long- and short-term memberships only when the customer's switching coupon or discount is high relative to the transportation cost.

Artificial Intellingence and Algorithmic Price Collusion in Two-sided Markets

(Submitted)

PDF (2024)

Increased network externalities significantly enhance collusion, suggesting AI algorithms exploit them to maximize profits.
Higher user heterogeneity or greater utility from outside options generally reduce collusion, while higher discount rates increase it. Tacit collusion remains feasible even at low discount rates.

Exclusive Dealing and Entry by Competing Two-Sided Platforms

R&R International Journal of Industrial Organization

HBS Working Paper (2021) New Draft Coming Soon

The introduction of non-exclusive contracts in addition to exclusive contracts softens the competition for content providers between platforms, as they have more tools to extract content providers’ surplus.

(2020) Some Aspects of the Obstacle Problem, Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellín

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