Research

Working Papers

Artificial Intellingence and Algorithmic Price Collusion in Two-sided Markets

(Submitted)

PDF (2024)

Increased network externalities significantly enhance collusion, suggesting AI algorithms exploit them to maximize profits.
Higher user heterogeneity or greater utility from outside options generally reduce collusion, while higher discount rates increase it. Tacit collusion remains feasible even at low discount rates.

Dynamic Competition for Customer Memberships

Accepted for publication at the Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

If firms can choose between long- and short-term memberships, the latter are offered in equilibrium. This result is robust to various extensions, including switching coupons or discounts, naive consumers, sunk costs, and asymmetric differentiation parameters.
Firms are indifferent between long- and short-term memberships only when the customer's switching coupon or discount is high relative to the transportation cost.

Competition and Collusion in Two-Sided Markets with an Outside Option

R&R International Journal of Industrial Organization

PDF (2023)

We introduce pricing formulas for competition and collusion models of two-sided markets with an outside option.
Comparing collusion to competition, we find that in cases of small cross-side externalities, collusion results in decreased normalized net deterministic utilities, reduced market participation and increased price, on both sides of the market.

Exclusive Dealing and Entry by Competing Two-Sided Platforms

R&R International Journal of Industrial Organization

HBS Working Paper (2021) New Draft Coming Soon

The introduction of non-exclusive contracts in addition to exclusive contracts softens the competition for content providers between platforms, as they have more tools to extract content providers’ surplus.

(2020) Some Aspects of the Obstacle Problem, Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellín